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Abstract
Over the last two decades, grassroots altruism,
enabled through platforms such as DonorsChoose.org,
has resulted in successful funding of innumerable and
essential public school projects across the country.
While such channels become critical fundraising
mechanisms, there is an unintended possibility of
crowding out of these sources by governmental
initiatives which aim to shed light on, and address
public school resource deficits. In this study, with
a focus on major public policy announcements, we
examine whether there is an unintended effect of
external measures, such as the signing of the Every
Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), on grassroots altruism,
which is possible to examine on online philanthropy
platforms. We surmise that, in such platforms,
donors could become complacent and take comfort in
the cognizance of an external agency addressing the
problems they care about – we call this the savior effect.
Importantly, from our analysis of panel data on the
platform, we find that the savior effect: (a) results in
declined donations toward under-served public school
projects on the platform, and (b) makes donations more
local, disproportionately impacting schools with high
concentrations of low-income and minority students,
which receive fewer instructional resources to begin
with. Our work has important policy implications
for public schools, donor communities, and online
fundraising platforms.
1. Introduction
Equity and adequacy in funding are prerequisites
for the provision of equal educational opportunity [1].
However, it is a widely-established concern that public
schools in the United States of America are both
underfunded and inequitably funded [2]. Public school
educators continue to dip into their own pockets to
the tune of at least $459 every year [3], with teachers
in high-poverty schools shelling out more of their own
money. Limited budgets and red tape have led many
teachers to seek outside funds for classroom projects.
Recently, philanthropic crowdfunding, enabled
through platforms like DonorsChoose.org, has catalyzed
teachers efforts to generate resources to address resource
shortages. In addition to providing a new way to
fund educational needs, a notable difference with such
platforms1 is that teachers drive decisions about what
to raise funds for and how much to raise. A teacher
can set up a campaign in a matter of minutes and
receive funding for basic classroom supplies, curricular
materials, technology, enrichment programs and a host
of other expenses. When it works, crowdfunding
can provide fast money that can directly get into the
hands of teachers with few barriers to entry. However,
such platforms are perceived to have contrasting effects
on public education. At one end, they can serve
underfunded schools and provide them access to private
funding. At the other extreme, they can provide a
mechanism for schools serving affluent communities
to further access additional capital, and increase the
’resource-divide’ in schools. The overall impact of
such platforms has been increasing over time. For
example, DonorsChoose recently highlighted that close
to a billion dollars (USD 971M) have been raised
over the last two decades with funds wholly going
towards teacher-led and student-led projects serving
school needs2. In essence, online platforms have
evolved to become a non-trivial fundraising mechanism
for schools.
Meanwhile, school districts, boards, state and
federal policy makers have been making efforts
to improve and promote transparency of school
governance. Periodically-reauthorized federal
initiatives (Elementary and Secondary Education
Act or ESEA: 1965, No Child Left Behind or NCLB:
2002, Every Student Succeeds Act or ESSA: 2015) have
set federal standards for accountability, proficiency,
1DonorsChoose.org is one of many platforms used by educators to
raise funds online. Other leading platforms used by teachers include
GoFundMe.org, AdoptAClassrooom.org and Livingtree.
2Source: https://www.donorschoose.org/about/impact.html





and improvements - but allowed implementation
flexibility across state, local, and school district
boundaries. At some level, each of these federal
initiatives (ESEA, NCLB, ESSA) is concerned about
(a) students in poverty, (b) minorities, and (c) students
receiving special education services, among other
priorities. Specifically, ESSA was signed into law
in December 2015, wherein each state was given
further flexibility through federal-state negotiations
on accountability practices, proficiency standards,
and school-improvement processes - within a federal
framework. However, among several actions, it requires
states, for the first time, to break down how much
districts spend on each school [4].
Our research interest is at the junction of these two
phenomena. We are specifically interested in examining
whether announcements of such governmental
initiatives could unintentionally influence private
philanthropic donations to schools. As philanthropic
crowdfunding emerges as a viable fundraising
mechanism for teachers, external policy events of
direct concern to educational institutions are likely to
affect the behavior of potential donors. One key reason
is that external events and news-making phenomena
are critical elements of modern fundraising. Research
on charitable giving (e.g., [5]) suggests that charitable
giving is driven mainly by factors such as (a) awareness
of need, (b) solicitation, (c) costs and benefits, (d)
altruism, (e) reputation, (f) psychological benefits, (g)
values, and (h) efficacy. As we examine modern online
crowdfunding platforms like DonorsChoose, we believe
that external events, such as a major education policy
with accountability and transparency implications being
passed, could noticeably affect donor perceptions,
impacting some of these donation-driving factors,
thereby shaping eventual donors’ views and behaviors.
Our study specifically examines whether such external
events affect observed donor behavior, recipients, and
the overall online fundraising ecosystem.
Two aspects of online platforms are critical for
such altruism to work. First, on the recipient
side of the platform, there need to be enterprising
teachers who recognize the potential of such alternate
fundraising mechanisms. Second, on the provider side,
there needs to be a growing base of philanthropic
donors who need to get matched to the aid-seeking
projects that serve student needs. We believe this
second (fragile) component, donor funding behavior,
is likely to be subject to perception biases, nature and
extent of news coverage, and overall vicissitudes in
prevailing public opinion. If announcements of federal
initiatives are followed by discernible public dialogue
surrounding transparency and accountability, donor
perceptions may be affected. Since donor contributions
form the lifeblood of successful online crowdfunding
effectiveness, we believe that it is important to examine
whether donor behavior is indeed affected by such
external events.
If donors perceive that (a) economy-spanning
policies are already addressing issues close to their
interest or (b) that a decrease in transparency and
accountability implies a lower burden on schools, they
could step back and focus their attention on alternate
interests. We term this effect ”savior effect” which
represents donors’ loss of zeal in times of need. Our
data shows that majority of the requests are from schools
catering to communities of lower socioeconomic status
(SES) (see Figure 1(A)); these communities could be
hurt disproportionately. Specifically of interest would be
the breadth of policies such as ESSA, since there would
be widespread shifts in the way schools are perceived as
critical recipients. While it is possible that the entirety
of contributions to such platforms could diminish, it
is also conceivable that donors might simply re-align
their interests within the platform to certain subsets of
interests.
With the radical evolution of digital technologies
and wide-spread diffusion of social media technologies,
the manner in which citizens consume news and
external happenings is evolving. With societal
causes such as education, online communities (e.g.,
connection of parents, teachers, and children) could
result in varied levels of awareness of public policy
events and of the differential financial states of local
institutions. Examining whether this differential
diffusion of awareness affects the distribution of private
funds is essential.
Research on philanthropy and public finance has
examined the crowding out hypothesis or the question
of whether government subsidies to nonprofits displaces
(crowds out) private philanthropic giving to these
causes. Some scholars (e.g., [6]) have predicted
that complete crowding out will occur, while other
work (e.g., [7]) has predicted fractional crowding out
(e.g., subsidies will displace less than the amount of
typical donations), a prediction that has also been
supported by experimental evidence [8]. Extant research
has examined the problem at the level of overall
financial resource distributions, but has not examined
contexts where there is no public donation but rather a
macroscopic policy event or announcement that matters
to the overall societal welfare.
This paper examines the savior effect by leveraging
the shock of the ESSA plan being effective for each
state in the school year of 2017-2018. We provide
empirical evidence that addresses the two key questions:
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(1) Does the public event of ESSA being passed
reduce private donations to schools? (2) Does the
event redistribute private donations? Our empirical
analysis starts by comparing the school raised amount
and fully funded rate before and after the policy
shock. We collate a 20-quarter (2015Q1 2019Q4)
panel of data representing 73,303 schools, totaling
509,859 observations. This data consists of fundraising
outcomes of U.S. elementary and secondary schools
as crowdfunders in DonorsChoose. We combine
this data with information about school demographics
and characteristics such as student membership and
full-time equivalents collected from National Center
for Education Statistics. We find that, with the
introduction of ESSA, there is a significant decline in the
donations schools receive through online fundraising.
We also observe that donations become more local
in nature after the implementation of the act. We
further stratify the schools based on their proportions
of low-income and minority students and show that
schools with predominantly low-income and/or minority
students receive fewer online donations. Next, we
utilize Google Trend to construct the measurement of
the donor awareness and document that donors from
states with higher awareness of ESSA give even lower
amounts and allocate a larger portion of their donations
locally. Our findings provide important implications for
public schools, donor communities, online fundraising
platforms, and policy makers, with details discussed in
Section 5.
2. Related Literature
This paper builds on the growing body of
information systems literature that studies online
crowdfunding and charity donations. Previous empirical
research has explored various factors within the
crowdfunding ecosystem to drive the donor behavior
or crowdfunding outcomes, such as characteristics of
crowdfunders [9, 10], access to information controls
[11], the social network and activities among advocates
[12], and information on prior contribution behavior
[13, 14] or charity performance metrics [15, 16]. This
study looks beyond internal drivers and contributes
to the literature by providing empirical validation on
an external driver, a major federal education policy
being passed, to the donor behavior and crowdfunding
outcomes.
There is a growing body of empirical research on
education that has studied the consequence of education
policies. Education policies are designed to enhance
student achievement social welfare; nevertheless,
previous research provides evidence on unintended
consequences of education policies. For example,
some researchers find no effects or negative effects on
the performance of at least some groups of students
attributable to NCLB [17, 18]; some observe that the
NCLB has had no effect on enrollment in education
majors and even reduced the percentage of education
degrees awarded by postsecondary institutions [19]; and
some show that while flexibility and autonomy might
be key components of ESSA, under-resourced districts
and schools might not experience such flexibility and
autonomy due to a lack of resources [20]. In this study,
we enhance the understanding of ESSA and identify
its another unintended consequence in fundraising
performance, that is, crowding out private crowdfunding
donations.
In the context of private donations, there has been
related research that has examined the crowding out
effect of government support in non-profit settings (e.g.,
[21, 22]). While evidence regarding the relationship
between government financial support and private
donations has not been conclusive, there has been
even less discussion on the role of intermediaries
(such as crowdfunding platforms) in the relationship
between government support and private donations (e.g.,
[23]). Since external shocks such as governmental
accountability-related initiatives do not correspond
to, or have direct effects on, financing structure of
schools, there is considerable value in examining such
relationships, especially since private giving through
non-profit technology platforms and its relationship to
governmental efforts is poorly understood. Similarly,
there is very minimal work that examines macro-policy
shocks on private donation towards public welfare
initiatives. Our work on the role of ESSA contributes
to his gap in our understanding of non-economic shocks
on private donation behavior through platforms, such as
Donorschoose.
An alternate stream of research in the area of
volunteering also contributes to our understanding by
focusing on macroscopic views on public goods and
social volunteering. There are two perspectives in
this stream. The substitution-based view is that
voluntary action originates from an unsatisfied demand
for collective goods that is not met by the government
(e.g., [24]). If the government performs these tasks,
the engagement of private volunteers in the society is
rendered unnecessary and will consequently decrease.
In contrast to this view is a complementariness-based
view between governmental initiatives and private
voluntary action [25]. In this view, governmental
effort does not replace civic activities, but rather
remains complementary to civic engagement [26]. Our
examination will help discover the role of donation
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platforms and private economic donation behavior when
governmental policy shocks are involved.
3. Research Context and Data
The research context in our study is
DonorsChoose.org, a crowdfunding platform based
in New York City, NY, which was established in
March of 2000. It is a nonprofit organization (NPO)
that allows individuals to donate directly to public
school classroom projects. In particular, DonorsChoose
enables teachers to request materials and resources
for their classrooms and makes these project requests
available to individual donors through its website.
Similar to other crowdfunding platforms, project
pages contain a description by the teacher and further
information about the concrete needs, the school,
location, poverty level, subject, grade level, how many
students are impacted by this project, and how many
donors have contributed to this project. If a partially
funded project expires (i.e., fails to attracted full funding
within a four-month period), donors get their donations
refunded as account credits, which they can use towards
other projects.
3.1. Data
To investigate how the external agency affects
school crowdfunding performance, we obtain data and
construct variables from the following sources for our
main analysis:
1. DonorsChoose.org
2. National Center for Education Statistics (NCES):
Common Core of Data (CCD)
The donation data, obtained via an API from
DonorsChoose.org, provide five separate datasets at the
levels of classroom projects, teachers, schools, donors
and project donations. We collect donation records
between 2011 to 2019. Over this period, 2,210,531
projects have been posted on DonorsChoose.org, among
which 1,469,368 (66%) were fully funded.
We obtain school demographic information, from
NCES - CCD. The CCD is the Department of
Education’s primary database on public elementary
and secondary education in the US and it manages
a comprehensive, annual, national database of all
public elementary and secondary schools. The
database includes demographic information for schools
as reported on the annual CCD School Universe
Survey. The survey includes directory and status
information, student membership dis-aggregated by
grade, race/ethnicity and sex, full time employees
by professional category, and counts of students with
free/reduce-priced lunch plan. The demographic
information is collected at the yearly level and it has
been comprehensive since 2015.
We collate a school-level dataset by matching the
two databases with the NCES school identifier. The
final matched sample consists of 73,303 unique schools
which cover 68% of all the elementary and second
schools in the US. In our main analysis, we focus on the
period of twenty quarters from 2015 to 2019. We select
this study period for three reasons. First, as mentioned
earlier, the yearly demographic information of schools
has been comprehensive since 2015 and is available until
2019. We expand our study period to 2011-2019 for
additional analyses. Second, we use quarters rather than
years as the time units to ensure that the study period
covers at least five time units (quarters) before and after
the policy shift, given that the ESSA was widely in effect
in the school year of 2017-2018. Third, as the quarterly
data provides sufficient observations, we do not break
down to monthly data to avoid low variations for the
yearly information of school characteristics.
3.2. Variable Definition
We construct a set of school-specific variables based
on the unique dataset compiled from the two data
sources described above. The main variables are
summarized in Table 1.
Dependent Variables
We use several crowdfunding performance outcomes
as dependent variables in our analysis. Our primary
dependent variable, Proportion Funded, is a proportion
of projects succeeded in reaching its fundraising goal
[9]. Another performance outcome, Amount Raised,
measured the total dollar amount raised by the school
[9, 27]. We split Amount Raised into two additional
dependent variables – Local Amount and Outside
Amount based on the locations of the schools and
donors. Specifically, Local Amount measures the
contribution amount raised from donors located in the
same first three digits of zip code as the school; Outside
Amount measures the contribution amount raised from
donors outside the area with the three-digit zip code. We
choose the first three digits of zip codes rather than five
digits as the locational unit because, while five-digit zip
codes are feasible for schools, geographic information
of donors is available only at the three-digit zip code
level. We also use the state as an alternative metric to
distinguish local and non-local donors.
Key Independent Variable
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Table 1. Variables and Summary Statistics
Variable Description Source Mean St. Dev. Median # Schools # Obs.
Amount Raised Total dollar amount raised through the platform DonorsChoose 1294.70 2726.40 601.10 73303 509859
Proportion Funded Ratio of funded projects to total projects DonorsChoose 0.65 0.40 0.83 73303 509859
Local Amount Dollar amount contributed by local donors DonorsChoose 321.70 792.34 100.00 73303 509859
Outside Amount Dollar amount contributed by non-local donors DonorsChoose 973.10 2363.62 429.30 73303 509859
Num. Projects Number of projects posted on the platform DonorsChoose 3.10 4.95 2.00 73303 509859
Proportion Basic Ratio of basic projects to total projects DonorsChoose 0.33 0.40 0 73303 509859
Amount Requested Total requested dollar amount DonorsChoose 2240.13 4464.08 1087.81 73303 509859
Low-Income Number of Low-income students (qualified for NSLP) CCD 314.00 299.98 254 73303 509859
Minority Number of non-white students CCD 383.80 392.61 301 73303 509859
Num. Students Total student counts CCD 629.10 468.65 535 73303 509859
FTE Full-time equivalents CCD 37.27 26.14 32.20 73303 509859
The main independent variable in our analysis is
ESSA, a binary indicator for the announcement of the
ESSA. While the ESSA technically went into effect
for the 2017-18 school year, a state could only put its
plan into effect, after the U.S. Department of Education
signed off on the state plan. To obtain information on the
ESSA approval associated with each state, we reviewed
the consolidated state plan of ESSA and recorded the
date when the plan had been authorized.
Control Variables
Besides the announcement of ESSA, several other
characteristics could potentially be associated with
a school’s crowdfunding performance, reflected
in its Proportion Funded and Amount Raised.
Recent empirical research has studied several of
such characteristics [28, 29]. We therefore include
these factors in our control variables. Specifically,
we consider project-level factors – the number of
projects posted by schools (Num. Projects), the project
amount requested by schools(Amount Requested) and
proportion of projects that schools request for their
students’ basic needs (Proportion Basic)3. We aggregate
these project-level factors to the school-quarter level.
The remaining controls can only be constructed at
the school-year level. We utilize the CCD database to
measure the poverty level (Low-Income) by constructing
the logged number of students who are qualified for
the National School Lunch Program (NSLP)4. We
separately construct the logged number of full-time
equivalents (FTE) to indicate the utilization of school
resources. We also include the school size, measured
by the logged number of student membership excluding
adult education (Num. Students), to control for
the influence of school scale on the crowdfunding
performance. In our additional analysis, we consider
3We identify basic projects by grouping project resource types
related to ”classroom basics”, ”flexible seating”, ”food, clothing
hygiene”, ”books”, and ”reading nooks, desks storage”.
4The NSLP is a federally assisted meal program operating
in public and nonprofit private schools and residential
child care institutions. It provides nutritionally balanced,
low-cost or no-cost lunches to children each school day.
https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/nslp-fact-sheet
the logged number of non-white students to assess the
school minority (Minority).
4. Empirical Analysis and Results
While ESSA was signed in December 2015 and
went into effect in the 2017-18 school year, ESSA
plans for different states went into effect at different
points in time, based on when the US Department
of Education signed off on the state’s plan. This
temporal and geographic variation allows us to examine
the causal effect of ESSA plan announcements on
donor behavior, ruling out alternative explanations. We
specifically leverage the date when each state’s plan
was approved as an external shock to compare donation
activity before and after the shock. In this section,
we first present our before-after analysis at the school
level to assess the impact of ESSA authorization on
the donations that schools receive through the platform.
We demonstrate the robustness of our results using
alternative models and variable specifications. Finally,
we conduct additional analyses to examine how the
impact of ESSA announcements varies across schools.
4.1. Main Effects of ESSA Announcement:
Drops in School Crowdfunding Success
We leverage the exogenous policy shock on
schools in each state as a natural experiment and
use a before-after analysis to mimic a randomized
experimental design and thus produce a unbiased
estimate of the ”treatment effect,” i.e., the impact of the
ESSA on school crowdfunding performance. Our model
specification for the before-after analysis is as follows:
Yijts = β · ESSAjts +X ′its · γ + Schooli
+ Y eart × Statej +Quarters + εijts.
In the equation above, i denotes a school, j
denotes the state that the school is located in, and t
denotes the time period. Yijts denotes the dependent
variables defined above. Because the dependent variable
Amount Raised, Local Amount and Outside Amount are
non-negative continuous data, we follow the convention
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Table 2. Effects of ESSA on School Crowdfunding Performance
Dependent variable:
Amount Raised Proportion Funded Local Amount Outside Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ESSA −0.233∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.018) (0.057) (0.077)
Num. Projects 1.734∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 1.868∗∗∗ 1.815∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.007) (0.030) (0.047)
Amount Requested 0.145∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.004) (0.021) (0.021)
Proportion Basic 0.134∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010)
School-Level Controls Y Y Y Y
School, State, Year, Quarter (FE) Y Y Y Y
Observations 509,859 509,859 509,859 509,859
R2 0.478 0.341 0.497 0.454
Adjusted R2 0.390 0.230 0.412 0.362
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
to characterize the model by log of the dependent
variables. Note that while Proportion Funded is a
proportion data which is appropriate to employ the
fractional Probit model to estimate the model, we run the
before-after analysis for Proportion Funded using the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model to make the results
more interpretable5. ESSAjt is the treatment dummy
variable that equals 1 if the state j passed its ESSA plan
at time t. Xit represents a vector of demographic control
variables with γ being their corresponding estimated
coefficients.6 The vector Schooli contains school fixed
effects, Y eart and Quartert contain time fixed effects
for each time period, and Statej contains state fixed
effects. We consider the school and state fixed effects
to account for potentially unobserved school and state
characteristics and cluster the standard errors at the state
level to further control for potential correlations in error
terms. We include the year and quarter fixed effects to
adjust for the unobserved temporal trends over our study
period.
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the main
effects of ESSA announcement on school crowdfunding
performance. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient
estimates of the variable, ESSA, are significant at the
one-percent level and economically large, indicating
that schools that are in a state that had its ESSA
plan signed are likely to have inferior crowdfunding
outcomes. The results show that schools in states
where ESSA signing is announced see a drop of 23%
in the amount raised and a 7.3% drop in the proportion
of projects that meet their funding goals compared to
schools in states where ESSA is not yet signed into
effect. In summary, the announcement of ESSA signing
5We observe consistent findings when using the fractional Probit
model.
6All the control variables are scaled by log-transformation except
Proportion Basic.
is associated with a significant decline in the donations
that schools receive. It appears that the knowledge of the
implementation of the act diminishes the donors’ drive
to fund teachers’ projects.
In columns (3) and (4), we report results for our
second model where the dependent variables are the
amounts raised from local donors and outside donors
respectively. We calculate Local Amount as the
contribution amount raised from donors located in the
same first three digits of zip code as the school and
Outside Amount as the contribution amount raised from
donors outside the area with the three-digit zip code.7
The coefficient estimate of the variable, ESSA is positive
in column (3), while the estimate in column (4) is
negative. The results also hold if we use the state as
an alternative metric to identify local/non-local donors.
This suggests that schools raise more in donations from
local donors and less from non-local donors after the
state’s ESSA plan is signed into effect.
As for the estimates of the control variables
in Table 2, we observe that schools’ fundraising
requirements, measured by Num. Projects, Amount
Requested and Proportion Basic, have significant
impacts on the fundraising outcomes. One explanation
for our finding could be that the introduction of the
ESSA reduces and redistributes donations for schools
through influencing schools’ fundraising requirements.
To test this explanation, we use Num. Projects, Amount
Requested and Proportion Basic as dependent variables
and regress them on ESSA in the before-after analysis.
As shown in Figure 1(D), the insignificant coefficients
of ESSA on these dependent variables indicate schools’
fundrasing requirements do not change significantly
after the introduction of ESSA. Alternatively stated,
7We choose the first three digits of zip codes rather than five digits
as the locational unit because, while five-digit zip codes are available
for schools, geographic information of donors is available only at the
three-digit zip code level
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Note. (A) presents the proportion of projects by the poverty level of the school making the request, 2015-2019; 45% of all requests come from schools in the highest poverty bracket (in which 65%
or more students receive free or reduced-price meals). (B) shows that the effects on lower SES students and Title 1 schools are even stronger (with coefficients of the interaction terms significantly
negative). (C) presents donors’ ESSA awareness by state (shades), percentage change in school crowdfunding performance after the signing of the ESSA state plan (circle colors: red - negative,
green - positive), and the number of schools by state (circle sizes); most schools experienced a decrease in crowdfunding performance after their state plans were signed. (D) presents that coefficients
of ESSA × Awareness for Raised amount, Proportion Funded, and Outside Amount are significantly negative, while the coefficients for Local Amount are significantly positive; we also observe
insignificant coefficients for Num. Projects, Proportion Basic, and Amount Requested. (E) compares crowdfunding performance before and after the ESSA announcement date, Dec 10, 2015 (the
green dashed line), between schools receiving donations from donors with high and low interests in the ESSA announcement; after the announcement of ESSA, schools with projects funded by
high-awareness donors (red line) see a significantly decline in the percentage of projects funded as compared to their low-awareness (green line) counterparts.
the policy directly reduces and redistributes the
donors’ contribution to schools’ projects rather than by
influencing the requirements and requests from schools.
Taken as a whole, this set of results provides the
first evidence suggesting that the approval of ESSA
is accompanied by the worsening of crowdfunding
outcomes for schools. We leverage the information
about ESSA signing in this before-after analysis and
conclude that ESSA announcement is associated with a
noticeable decrease in crowdfunding donation amounts
as well as the likelihood of a project getting funded.
Interestingly, we find that donations become more local
in nature after the sign-off of the act. That is, not only
does the announcement affect how much people give but
also how donors distribute their donations.
4.2. Impact on Lower SES Students and Title
1 Schools
As shown in Figure 1(A), majority of the requests
are from schools receiving fewer instructional resources
to begin with. To examine how the impact of
ESSA announcements varies across schools, we further
stratify schools based on (1) whether a school is a
Title 1 school8 and (2) the concentration of lower
SES students (measured by Low-Income and Minority
card2016universal).
We respectively include interaction terms,
ESSA×Low-Income, ESSA×Minority, and ESSA×Title
1, in the model relating ESSA announcements and
school crowdfunding outcomes. Figure 1(B) present
results for the impact on lower SES students and
Title 1 schools. The coefficients of the interaction
term on the three variables, ESSA × LowIncome,
ESSA × Minority and ESSA × Title1, are all
negative at the five-percent level. Our results suggest
that, when external shocks cause grassroots donors
to contribute less than they usually do, schools with
students from predominantly lower SES could be
disproportionately impacted.
8Title 1 is the largest federally funded educational program,
providing supplemental funds to school districts to assist schools




We next perform a series of tests using alternative
models and variable specifications to demonstrate the
robustness of our results.
Validity of Before-After Analysis
Our before-after analysis essentially creates a
difference-in-differences (DD) framework. We test the
validity of the DD design by focusing on a shorter
time window, 2015Q1 to 2018Q2. While many states
had their ESSA plans approved before the end of the
2017-2018 school year (i.e., June 15, 2018), eight
states received approvals for the plans after June 15,
20189. In the analysis of the short time window, we
perform an additional DD estimation by using 2017Q2
as the event time and schools in the states that had
not signed ESSA in the time window as the control
group. Shortening the time window allows us to
confirm immediate effects of ESSA. In Table 3, columns
(1) and (2) report results for the specifications where
the key independent variable is ESSA, which continue
to demonstrate that the ESSA sign-off is negatively
associated with school crowdfunding performance,
reflected through both Amount Raised and Proportion
Funded. In columns (3) and (4), the coefficients of
the interaction term, After×Treated, are negative at
the five-percent significance level, suggesting that the
finding holds with the alternative DD design in a short
time window. In columns (5) and (6), the coefficients
of the interaction term, Pre-period×Treated, pick up
differences in the trend of crowdfunding performance,
before the shift between ESSA-Implemented (treated)
and ESSA-NotImplemented (control) groups. The
statistically-insignificant estimates suggest that the
parallel-trend assumption cannot be rejected when we
use either Amount Raised or Proportion Funded as the
dependent variable. In other words, in the absence of the
treatment (ESSA), the difference between our treatment
and control groups is roughly constant over time.
Donor Awareness and DDD Analysis
A potential problem with our before-after analysis
is that donors may not be aware when the state ESSA
plan was passed, thus other factors unrelated to the
policy change might affect the donations contributed
by the lesser-aware fraction of the population. To
further refine the subgroup of the population affected
by the policy change (i.e., the treatment group),
we construct a Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
(DDD) framework including donors’ awareness of the
policy. To measure donors’ awareness of ESSA, we
9These states include California, Maine, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia
gather data on the relative volume of search traffic for
terms related to ESSA10 from Google Trends11. The
distribution of relative search volume by state is shown
in Figure 1(C). We then use a binary variable to indicate
whether donations raised by schools are mainly sourced
from states with high interest in the searched terms.
Specifically, we code the variable Awareness as 1 if the
school has more than half of its funds raised from donors
in the states whose interest indices are higher than the
median in a given year. As shown in Figure 1(D),
coefficients of ESSA × Awareness for Amount Raised
and Proportion Funded are significantly negative; the
coefficient of ESSA × Awareness for Local Amount is
significantly positive and that for Outside Amount is
significantly negative. This suggests that donors from
states with higher awareness of ESSA give even lower
amounts and allocate a larger portion of their donations
locally.
ESSA Announcement as an Alternative Shock
While we find that donor awareness strengthens the
effect of ESSA on school crowdfunding performance,
another possibility is that donors may not know or
mentally register when ESSA is signed into effect
in each state. To address this possibility, we use
an alternate shock – the widely-acknowledged ESSA
announcement date, Dec 12, 201512 and code the binary
variable Announced to be 1 for the period after Dec
12, 2015. We use the variable of donor awareness
to separate treated (Awareness = 1) and control
(Awareness = 0) groups. As shown in Figure 1(E), the
trends of school crowdfunding performance (reflected
by the proportion of fully funded projects) for treated
(the red line) and control (the blue line) groups are
close with each other before the policy announcement
and split after 2015, providing preliminary evidence
that the ESSA announcement is associated with school
crowdfunding performance. Our empirical results also
show that the the findings remain consistent whether we
use the date of sign-off for each state’s plan or the main
announcement date as the shock.
Analyses at the Donation Level
To augment our analysis, we compile a
donation-level dataset with each donation record
including information of the donor, project, and
donation amount. Focusing on the period of 2011 to
10We search for the term ”ESSA” and ”Every Student Succeeds
Act”, and excluded irrelevant terms to make sure that the results are
relevant to the policy. The search period is over the 12/1/2015 to
3/31/2017 time period, which covered the peak volume in search traffic
for the ESSA-related terms.
11Google Trends is a public Web facility of Google, Inc., which is
based on Google Search.
12To retain more pre-announcement periods, we perform this
analysis over the period from 2011 to 2019.
Page 4145
Table 3. Checks for Validity of Main DID Design
Dependent variable:
Amount Raised Proportion Funded Amount Raised Proportion Funded Amount Raised Proportion Funded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ESSA −0.216∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.024)
After× Treated −0.047∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.023) (0.005)
Pre-period× Treated −0.00002 0.00002
(0.0001) (0.00002)
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
School, State, Year, Quarter (FE) Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 321,484 321,484 321,484 321,484 209,444 209,444
R2 0.372 0.407 0.372 0.407 0.446 0.471
Adjusted R2 0.212 0.256 0.212 0.255 0.235 0.270
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
2019, we use a similar empirical framework to test the
effects of ESSA announcment on the donation amount
at the donation level instead of school level, as in our
main analysis. In brief, our findings continue to hold
when we alter the level of analysis from aggregate
(school) to granular (donation).
5. Discussion
Our analysis finds that an unintended consequence
of the announcement of ESSA was a significant
decline in the donations schools received through
DonorsChoose.org. It appears that the knowledge of
signing of the act diminished the overall eagerness of
donors to fund teachers’ projects. With increasing
evidence of teachers going above and beyond their
responsibilities to pay for school supplies and initiatives
themselves, a voluntary donor-supported solution that
eases teachers burdens, like Donorschoose, also appears
to be affected when the policy announcement is made.
One possible explanation for our observation is the
shift in perception of needs from private citizens. When
standards are strict, and schools are struggling to meet
the demands, private donors might feel an obligation to
contribute to the gaps in resources. When standards are
relaxed, this moral obligation and intent to contribute
could diminish. By the same logic, federal laws
that include provisions that impact accountability, and
transparency of school administration might shift donors
beliefs in a non-trivial way. For instance, one view is
that NCLB made it strict that each state had to meet
federal standards, but they gave states less flexibility in
how they could go about achieving the goals. When
ESSA gets passed, there is more flexibility for school
districts and policy makers in setting student goals for
states. So, the burden on states goes lower and private
donors might perceive that they do not need to contribute
since schools are likely to get a longer leash to set and
meet education standards.
Interestingly, we find that donations became more
local in nature after the act is signed off. That is, not
only did the measure affect how much people give but
also how donors distributed their donations. Donors
from states with higher awareness of ESSA gave even
lower amounts and allocated a larger portion of their
donations locally. Our results remain consistent whether
we use the state-specific approval dates or the overall
announcement date as the event. Our findings also
remain consistent when we alter the level of analysis
from the aggregate level (school) to the granular level
(donation).
It is well known that schools with higher proportions
of students with low SES have fewer resources to begin
with. Unfortunately, our results suggest that potentially
well-intentioned external events like ESSA being signed
into law might cause grassroots donors to contribute
less than they usually do. So, the school districts with
low SES students are likely to experience this effect
disproportionately.
Our study has important implications for the public
education system. For public schools hoping to raise
funds online, it is important to remind donors in
project descriptions that while the effects of government
measures such as ESSA only gradually trickle down
to the schools over time, teachers who are close
to the ground reality know first-hand the immediate
needs of their students. Donors hoping to help
schools truly in need should realize that if donors only
contributed to projects in their school districts, then
wealthy school districts will receive the most funding
for their projects. For online fundraising platform
designers, our findings reveal that the hyper-local nature
of the donations on such platforms intensifies the
rich-gets-richer problem in public education. Given
this, it is important for platforms to use nudges such
as email promotions wisely, especially around the
announcements of governmental measures. Instead of
showing potential donors only projects from their zip
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codes and states, it might be prudent to expose donors
from wealthy school districts to projects initiated by
teachers from schools in poorer school districts. Finally,
for education policy makers, our findings serve as a
reminder of the tendency of people to focus on the needs
of their immediate communities. Therefore, platforms
like DonorsChoose, no matter how well-intentioned
and helpful for meeting teachers’ immediate needs, are
not a replacement for comprehensive policies directed
at addressing the needs of low socio-economic status
students, families and communities.
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